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Appellant refers to a portion of the last paragraph
on page 2 of the opinion, which is as follows:
"lt must also be noted that in the matters referred to, plaintiff relies chiefly upon alleged
promises and representations of the architect, and
upon the contention that the architect was agent
for the defendants. An architect is not ordinarily
a general agent for his employer (3 Am. Jur.
1000) and in this instance it was expressly so
provided in the contract documents. Clearly he
did not have authority to bind Parry on a promise
of construction of another structure.''

Appellant states:
''The statement is not only an unfair statement of the contention of appellant, but it contradicts the findings submitted by respondents and
adopted by the trial court.''
rrhe above quotation from the opinion, clearly states
that the architect was not a general agent of the defendants Parry. This position is substantiated by the following taken from plaintiff's Exhibit P-3, which is the
general conditions of the contract:
•'~1rt. 15. Changes in the Work.-The Owner,
without invalidating the Contract, may order
extra work or make changes by altering, adding
to or deducting from the work, the Contract Sum
being adjusted accordingly. All such work shall
be executed under the conditions of the original
contract except that any claim for extension of
time caused thereby shall be adjusted at the time
of ordering such change.''
"In giving instructions, the Architect shall
have authority to make minor changes in the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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work, not involving extra cost, and not inconsistent with the purposes of the building, but otherwise, except in an emergency endangering life or
property, no extra work or change shall be made
unless in pursuance of a written order from the
Owner signed or countersigned by the Architect,
or a written order from the Architect stating that
the Owner has authorized the extra work or
change, and no claim for an addition to the contract sum shall be valid unless so ordered.''
"Art. 38. Architect's Status.-rrhe Architect shall
haYe general supervision and direction of the
work. He is the agent of the Owner only to the
extent provided in the Contract Documents and
when in special instances he is authorized by the
Owner so to act, and in such instances he shall
upon request, show the Contractor written authority.''
These contract provisions clearly show that the
architect was an agent of the defendants Parry, and not
a general agent to the extent of making representations
to the contractor for additional construction, which
would ha\·e to be within the scope of the architect agenc:•.r
to be binding upon the defendants Parry.
There has never been any denial that under the
terms of the contract documents that the architect was
the limited agent in accordance with the contract documents of the defendants Parry .
. A.t the bottom of page 6, appellant makes this state-

ment:
"While the architect was the agent of the
owners, his representations and instructions to
Mr. :Millard as to 'dwt should be included in the
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bid was what was to be excluded, were the repre~wntations and instructions of the owners.''
ln answer to the above statement it should be :firstly
contended, that defendants Parry would be responsible
for the statements of the architect, only within the scope
of his authority, and they were limited by the contract
documents as aforestated. Secondly, the plaintiff had
in his possession the plans and specifications which were
1 he basis of his bid to be made, and there is no variance
behveen any of the sets of plans and specifications of
the plaintiff, defendants, or the set :filed with the City
for the permit to build.

On Page 7, appellant makes the following statement:
'' rrhe architect procured a bid on plumbing
and told Mr. 1Iillard to base his bid on that :figure.
He also told Mr. :Jiillard to exclude sewer as that
was to be covered by another construction project.
It is undisputed that the contract documents reserve to the owner the right to let other contracts,
(Exhibit P-3)."
Included within the specifications were the following statements concerning connection of the sewer and
water in the building to the city mains. Under the general heading of plumbing in the specifications at page 34,
under the heading "Utilities" it is provided:
''Provide and install a 1lh" diameter water
service with all necessary fittings as shown on the
plot plan.
''Provide all necessary material and labor for
the installation of a 4" diameter soil pipe sewer
4
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

from the building and connecting to the city sewer
as shown on the plot plan.''
Under the heading ''Waste and Vent System'' at
page 35 of the specifications, it provides as follows:
·'Provide a complete system of waste and vent
piping as necessary and connect to sewer system."
The specifications, including the above quotations,
including the water and sewer system, .were in the hands
of the plaintiff prior to signing of the contract for $82,000
on January 29, 195l, such that plaintiff on the signing of
the contract agreed to the specifications for construction
as above quoted.
The plot plan has been discussed numerous times
by appellant. Subsequent to January 29, 1951, the date
of the signing of the contract, a plot plan was evolved
and given to the plaintiff, so that there was a plot plan
on the project, prior to the necessity for use of the same.
Reference is here made to Article 3 of Exhibit P -3,
which is the general conditions of the contract which
is as follows :
''Art. 3. Detail Drawings and Instructions.The Architect shall furnish with reasonable
promptness, additional instructions by means of
drawings or otherwise, necessary for the proper
execution of the work. All such drawings and
instructions shall be consistent with the Contract
Documents, true developments thereof, and reasonably inferable therefrom.''
It should be supposed that all drawings for the
construction of the eleven unit building were not comSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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plete in every detail, as to those instances at the latter
part of the construction, such as connecting sewer and
water systems, but the plot plan was furnished, the
speeifications provided for the water and sewer systems
1o In• cormeded and tl1e architect ,Johnson testified that
it wa~ anticipated that there would be a complete system
of waste and vent piping and connected to the sewer
system of Salt Lake City (R. 357) and that there would
be a water system connecting the 11 unit apartment to
the ~alt Lake City water system. (R. 358).
Appellant numerous times during the brief has referred to the bid obtained by the architect (Ex. P-4) and
(Ex. 17), an estimate sheet attached to a statement dated
December 14, 1950 of the architect. Counsel for appellant
seems to utterly disregard that portion of Exhibit P-4,
l"Xcept the last yellow sheet which bears date of January
8, 1951. Attention is called to page 4 of Exhibitlt4, in
which it is recited in the bid of Grant Barnes on the
plumbing the following:
·'Sewer - approx. $2.20 per foot Estimate 150 ····--····-------···············--·--·$330.00
Water service 35c per footEstimate 100 --···········-···········-····--·-··--

35.00''

These two items are included within the original bid
of Grant Barnes and total $5,666.53. Counsel for appellant completely disregarded the itemized bid which
includes the estimate for water and sewer service, and
takes a subsequent bid, dated January 8, 1951 and relies
upon the same.
6
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It would seem to counsel for the defendants Parry,
that plaintiff having had great experience in general
contracting, which he has, that he would have noticed
some discrepency between the two bids, of Exhibit P-4,
and Exhibit 17, and which bids defendants Parry never
did see until in another law suit in December of 1951.
It might be that Page 4 of Exhibit P-4 has never been
seen by counsel for appellant or has been entirely disregarded in his argument.
At page 8 of the appellant's brief, he states:
''The opinion likewise does not mention the
fact that defendant Parry had in his possession
Exhibit D-27 dated December 14, 1950, which
stated as the cost of the plumbing the exact
amount of Exhibit P-4 which specifically declared
that sewer and water were not included."
Exhibit D-27 is the D. A. Olsen Company's installation order signed by Vern Millard, dated April15, 1951,
and was never seen by defendants Parry until March
of 1933, during a trial when he obtained this exhibit fron1
Mr. Olsen for the purpose of having the exact amount
of the heating contract determined. As before stated,
Exhibit P-4 included the page 4 ·which counsel for plaintiff disregards, was never in the possession of defendants
Parry until it was taken from Case #94041 for the purpose of this trial, and therefore was handled between
the architect and the plaintiff.
Exhibit D-27 says nothing at all about plumbing, but
has reference to installation of the heating system.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Counsel for appellant makes the further statement
on page 8 of his brief:
"When the heating
the contract documents
costs were in excess of
architect instructed :Mr.
bid.''

was decided upon after
were signed, the heating
the allowance which the
Millard to provide in his

Exhibit 27 discloses that the heating contract was
<.·utered into by the plaintiff with D. A. Olsen Company
for the sum of $7,875.00, yet the estimate of the architect,
whieh is on the last page of B-17 indicates that the heating and hot water system, based on architect's estimate
was the sum of $8,100.00, so that in effect the contract
was let for $225 less than the architect's estimate.
On page 9 of appellant's brief, he states:
''When defendant Parry constructed the sewer,
he did not use soil pipe, which is the least expensive type of construction, but he used cast iron
which cost several times more, and instead of
laying the line directly to the street as shown on
the master plan, he ran it diagonally and much
deeper which made the line considerably longer
and more costly.''
Counsel for defendants Parry would refer counsel
for appellant to Exhibit 42, which is a statement and
rancelled check attached, to George Chase in the sum
of $426.82 covering payment for the pipe used by the
defendants Parry at his own cost of installing the sewer
and on which he was given credit during trial as being
an item within the contract terms to be done on the part
8
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of the plaintiff. The third from the last item on Exhibit
42 shows that there was 220 feet of 4" soil pipe used,
which cost $220.00, so that the defendants did use soil
pipe in this construction.
Counsel for appellant further, at the bottom of
page 9, states:
''The reason the Court did not find anything
to disturb the findings is possibly because the
Court overlooked the fact that the trial court
based its allowance not on cost-plus 10% but on
a theory of ''reasonable value,'' which amounted
to only a small fraction of actual costs incurred
by plaintiff.''
If counsel for appellant would take the time to
examine page 72 of the record, he would discover that
there is an itemized list covering the entire page of
where the court granted to the plaintiff 10% overhead
plus 10% contractor's fee, which totaled the sum of
$7,230.34, for extras.
On page 73 of the record, is further itemized those
items upon which the contractor was allowed 10%, where
the work was done by a subcontractor. The plaintiff in
this instance received his 10% over the subcontractor's
costs, thus the trial court never did determine the extras
upon a "REASONABLE COST BASIS" but on those
items performed by the plaintiff himself of extra costs,
the trial court included 10% overhead and then a 10%
contractor's fee to make the total for each item of extra.

9
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Point 2. THE COUR'r HAS IN EFE,ECT DENIED
THE PLAINTIFF HIS CONSTErUTIONAL RIGHTS
OF APPEAL BY PREDICATING ITS DECISION ON
A srrA'rE OF FACTS MATERIALLY AT VARIANCE
WITH THE RECORD MADE IN THE DISTRICT
COUB/r.
Ou this matter, it seems to counsel for respondents
that counsel for appellant is implying that the decision
is based on facts not in the record, which has been disputed to the best ability of the writer of this brief.
Point 3. THE OPINION DISREGARDS ONE OF THE
FLAGRANrr ERRORS OF THE TRIAL COURT BY
IGNORING THE DISTINCTION BETWEEN RECOVERY FOR CHANGES ON THE BASIS OF COST
PLUS 10% AS AGREED UPO~, AND THE MUCH
LOWER BASIS OF "REASONABLE VALUE"
ADOPTED BY THE LOWER COURT.
The statement of counsel for appellant under this
point relates chiefly to the last portion set forth in
detail under Point 1, under a theory of "REASONABLE
ALLOWANCE'' against cost-plus 10% for extras. Again
pages 72 and 73 of the record, which are findings of the
trial court,· specifically itemize each item allowed by the
court as being extras on this construction job.
Counsel for appellant at page 11 of his brief states.
"In effect, the trial court said Mr. Millard
was entitled to his actual costs plus 10% as even
the defendants testified that such was the agree10
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ment, but in contradiction of such decision, the
court deprived .Mr. :Millard of thousands of dollars of his actual costs by allowing him only a
small fraction thereof.''
As this court has said in its opinion, the trial court
meticulously examined each item of extras from 1
through 60 and in several instances determined that the
items charged as extras were included within the original contract, and therefore were not chargeable as
extra items.
Point 4. rrHE DECISION IS CONTRARY TO LAW.
At page 12 of appellant's brief, he states:

''It makes no difference whether the agent was
specifically directed by the owners to make the
particular statements he made. The fact is that
he wae engaged to line up materials (which is
one of the functions of the general contractor).
It might be well to reflect on how it happened that
the architect in this instance was hired. The architect
and the plaintiff were at the site one morning when
defendant Parry appeared and it was through the contractor and his recommendations that the architect became employed.

It must be admitted that the contractor did additional work upon adjacent property of the defendants
Parry, as well as certain changes on this particular job,
namely installation of garbage disposals, sliding doors
on the bedroom closets, paving of the driveway and parkSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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ing area, changing of the type of glass in the louvers of
some of the rooms in three apartments, all such items
which were requested by the defendants were paid for
by the defendants without any question.
At page 14 of appellant's brief, he again refers to a
substitute of "REASONABLE ALLOWANCE" theory
instead of full recovery on the basis of contractor's
cost-plus 10%. This matter has been covered before.
Appellant's counsel further in the second paragraph
of page 14 says :

''It cost a lot of money to correct the mistakes
in the architect's plans.''
The defendants Parry are well aware of that fact,
having been allowed by the court the larger item in
dispute which was the fact that the floor joists in the
east end of the apartment ran in the wrong direction
such that the air conduits could not be concealed in the
ceiling which required the furring down of those walls
and which cost based upon the testimony of plaintiff's
superintendent on the job was allowed by the court.
On page 15 of appellant's brief he refers to an exhibit in case No. 94041 as to the statement of defendants
Parry to the fact that they had employed under an oral
contract the architect for architectural and supervisory
services, covering the erection of an 11 unit apartment
at the rear of 160 South 13th East Street, Salt Lake
City, Utah. There has never been any question but that
Defendant Parry hired the architect about December
14, 1950.

12
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Point 5. THE DECISION MISCONSTRUES THE
STIPULATION OF THE PARTIES, AND EXCEEDS
THE JURISDICTION OF THIS COURT BY REACHING OUT TO COVER A PORTION OF THE JUDGMENT FROM WHICH NO APPEAL WAS TAKEN.
In answer to the question of the matter of the
stipulation of payment of subcontractors, we again set
forth paragraph 5 of the stipulation:
'' 5. That as to the particular portions of said
elaims so paid with respect to which it shall
finally be adjudged that plaintiff is 11able, said
defendants Jesse H. Parry and wife shall be
entitled to credit in the above entitled cause as of
the date payment of claims is made (which credit
shall be in addition to the payment heretofore
made to plaintiff and/or to materialmen or subcontractors).''
The last paragraph of appellant's brief at point 5
states:
''The Parrys willfully delayed payment for
two years and caused the running up of interest
and costs, and the Court unjustly makes the plaintiff liable for the defaults of the Parrys.''
The best answer which the writer of this brief has
to this statement is Article 32 of the General Conditions
of the contract as follows:
"Art. 32. Liens.-Neither the final payment nor
any part of the retained percentage shall become
due until the Contractor, if required, shall deliver
to the Owner a complete release of all liens arising out of this Contract, or receipts in full in lieu
thereof and, if required in either case, an affidavit

13
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that so far as he has knowledge or information
the releases and receipts include all the labor and
material for which a lien could be filed."
Point 6. 'l1 HE DENIAL 0:£1, INTER:BJST ON SUMS
DUE AND OWING TO PLAINTIFF IS CONTRARY
'.rO LAW, AND AMOUNTS TO MAKING A CONTRACT FOR THE PARTIES WITHOUT ANY
MEETING OF MINDS.
At page 16 of appellant's brief
graph, he states:

111

the first para-

''The opinion states that the plaintiff billed
defendants on the wrong basis, and that therefore interest did not accrue.''
This court made no such statement in its opinion,
but on page 2, first paragraph it made the following
statement:
''That billing however was for a balance
claimed by plaintiff to be owing upon the whole
construction upon a cost-plus basis. The court
found, and we think correctly, that there was no
contract for construction of the building on the
cost-plus basis. That billing therefore cannot be
considered a billing for the extras referred to.''
The opinion therefore does not state that it was on
the wrong basis, but merely states it was not billed under
the contract of January 29, 1951 for extras.
Counsel further on page 17 states:
''The contract documents required in full
V\Tithin 30 days after completion of construction.
Completion was bound to cover extras and
changes. Defendants ordered most of the changes
and knew about them."

14
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The answer to that question has before been set
forth by Article 32, that the balance on the contract is
not due until such time as there has been delivery by
the contractor, of evidence of payment of bills to
materialmen and subcontractors, which was not the case
even at the date of trial.
CONCLUSION
It has been the endeavor of the writer within this
brief to point out that the opinion as originally rendered
by this court has completely covered all points raised
by appellant on his appeal.
Both during the trial of this matter, which was long
and tedious, there was much time devoted to extras
alleged on the part of appellant, and the opinion of this
court has in detail covered each point raised by appellant sufficiently and based upon ample record, such that
consideration of this court, based upon petition for rehearing should not change the results.
WHEREFORE, respondents respectfully pray that
the petition for rehearing be denied and that remittitur
in this matter issue.
Respectfully submitted
W. D. BEATIE
Attorney for Defendants
and Respondents Parry
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